Butchering Philosophy schizo bourdieu butchers

Butchering Philosophy

Butchering Philosophy schizo bourdieu butchers

No philosophy is such if it pretends to overfly its relations with life. In this sense, analytic ‘philosophy’ is no philosophy but just a particular kind of scholastic asset which aim is to serve science and justify a number of endogenous practices oriented to the scientific field. This ‘philosophy’ is for those who forget that philosophy is something that happens in their lives beyond the institution and regardless of the equations and formalities of the academic text: it is the imposition of a constrictor discipline that seeks to sustain a distinction that can only separate and divide philosophy itself at the expense of a series of pragmatisms given by office. Analytic ‘philosophy’ is more like the shame of philosophy because from its variety of objectivist effects it is unfolded a formalizing and logicizing laboratory.

Butchering Philosophy schizo bourdieu

Analytic ‘philosophy’ is indeed the terror of philosophy as its practitioners claim for themselves the right to state the scientific ‘truth’ as an absolute truth that has never been relative: this make them to believe that everything that does not involve such a truth is false and unworthy. This scholastic pragmatism ends up promoting philosophy as something which is not about life but about the academy itself: about the scholastic institution. Equations and syllogisms end up being the result of how philosophy has been patiently detached from life and depoliticized in relation to its vital and social functions. Analytic ‘philosophy’ is butchering philosophy into pieces and parties, making it pass through a laboratory of textual propositions and false assumptions that end up to be unsubstantial and pointless for those who are not subjected by its constrictions: it staggers the philosopher’s mind idiotizing his philosophical experience: it is a ‘philosophy’ only for those who still want to play their little school game at the expense of philosophy itself.

Butchering Philosophy schizo bourdieu splatter

16 Comments on “Butchering Philosophy

  1. I’m not familiar with philosophy, so it requires courage to leave a comment. But this post is so interesting that I can’t resist writing something on it. Your term “analytical philosophy” makes me laugh, even reminds me of Roland Barthes’s S/Z in which Barthes breaks Balzac’s text into pieces so that he can “analyze” each part… There remained no life nor passion of Balzac as a result of this “butchery” and I’m still wondering why Barthes does this…to murder the author? to kill the essence of the whole text? and succeed in academia? Your posts often make me think about several important things about life, philosophy, social system etc… Thank you!


    • Thank you very much, Esther 😉 I think Barthes was Nietzschean after all, his book Fragments d’un discours amoureux can give some clues about what he wanted to find about the text, though yes he did went through a very structural phase, maybe not analytical in this sense, but structural to some point. I wrote an article about Fragments, though i need to translate it, maybe i’ll do soon 😉


  2. Thanks for a kind reply! I’ve never read Fragments d’un discours amoureux…but I guess from its title that Barthes might have cut Balzac into small pieces for love of a text and internalized it ( almost cannibalistic love!? ), but I’m not really sure. I’d like to read your article on Fragments…if possible in translation ( for I’m not good at reading French ) I’m looking forward to it.


    • Well, yes, something like that, more or less 😉 I hope to translate my text on Fragments, it is very explicative on the matter and I admit that it is one of my favs 😉


  3. hi
    very nice 🙂
    perhaps this was what Hilary Putnam once had in mind, when he re-labelled “analytic” an “inexplicable noise”, sth like the sound the butcher’s knife produces in hands not acquainted with slashing it into the still warm flesh…
    Anyway. Barthes, at that time, was certainly influenced by the French structuralism, which in turn was, partially through personal junctions, linked to the French “theoretical” Marxism. Nevertheless, Barthes also praised semiotics in the Peircean version, hence he can not count as an “analytic” guy.
    The question of fragmentation is one of degree. Without classification you could neither recognize sth as sth, nor could you “understand” anything. Classification is a major molecule of cognition, sth like the H2O is for life. You need it and you do it all the time, even if you are going to grasp the totality/entirety of a text. Yet, the question is what happens with those fragments? If we take Schleiermacher’s version of hermeneutics we quickly see that those fragments form a population that becomes more and more autonomous, even if the would require the brain and the mind as kind of a substrate. Reforming a manifold of other textual beings.
    From which language you have to translate into Engl.?


    • Thanks again for your comment 😉 As I see them, there are no major molecules of anything at all i.e, they do not exist: say that all molecules are molecular, even beyond analytic rethoric. Yes, well, many of the posts that i have blogged recently are translations from Spanish to English, maybe that’s why they might sound a bit funny in their articulation. Some other post are written specifically in English, though am still working on to improve my anglo-scriptural voice 😉


  4. It has a tendency to be that way. However, I don’t think it has to be that way. I’d say it’s rather the analytical philosophers that’s faulting and not the discipline of analytic philosophy in itself. The problem is much like you’re pointing out – many analytical philosophers turned away from real life and real problems.

    Putnam defined analytic philosophy like this:
    (1) Analytical philosophy is nonideological, which means above all that it is nonpolitical and non- moralizing.
    (2) Analytical philosophy consists of piecemeal problem solving. Analytical philosophers need not have integrated positions; they write articles proposing and discussing arguments on specific philosophical problems and topics.
    (3) Analytical philosophy for a long time regarded value theory as second-class philosophy, and a concern with literature, the arts, culture, and the history of culture as at best optional for an analytical philosopher (although this has begun to change as the result of the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 1970).


    • Thanks for commenting, though precisely the point of this post is to say that it is not but the very discipline what prompts this butchering as a scholastic view that passes as ‘natural’ for those that exert it. The very discipline and its constituted field of action are the main problem, while the analytical philosophers do fault to their own frankness and self-objectivity. This issues needs a lot of digestation to get the whole picture: see that the (1) you share does not consider the conditions in which this kind of ‘philosophy’ is produced and reproduced, and this conditions are indeed ideological, political, and moralizing inside and outside the field of action they imply; the (2) you share means the laboratory this discipline raises and that justifies precisely with (1).


    • I think I understand you at least rather well. But don’t you think it’s a relevant distinction in this context between “analytic philosophy” as a field or academic discipline and doing philosophy in an analytic kind of way (for example doing something which happen to be in line with the characteristics Putnam stated for analytic philosophy)? Is one always faulting when doing philosophy in a sense that matches the criteria that Putnam stated in the quote above?


    • From a point of view in which life is taken as the object of philosophy: yes! though every philosophy is always in ‘fault’ with this broader epistemological respect: the problem with analytic philosophy is also the scholastic point of view, which means the scholastic know-how that is embodied as an academic habitus (dispositions), and that is reproduced with respect to a discipline and its field of action etc So the field is intimately constituted by these dispositions: schemes of action, perception and categorization that mostly are taken for granted (sense of practice), that mean all this procedures, skills, capabilities, embodied in the philosopher: that get naturalized thanks to this common view among partners and colleagues, though within all its scholastic vices, blind spots etc. Dispositions and fields are not to be taken separated: so, there is no relevant distinction as you are presupposing.


    • Well, we are speaking from different perspectives. I have read Bourdieu’s critique of academic philosophy, and sympathized with it. I didn’t find any reason to disagree with him on any point then. As I see though, Bourdieu’s concepts are adapted for scientific research with hypothesis and empirical investigations, and there’s always an element of uncertainty in it. While Wittgenstein is about imagining possibilities, Bourdieu is about investigating realities. It’s two very different games. I think Bourdieu was well aware of this distinction, and he would also appreciate Wittgenstein a lot.
      As for the question I asked, I was thinking one could but answer yes or no, depending on what perspective one choose to apply. I’m inclined to say that there are no specific philosophical problems… and in case analytic philosophy presupposes there are philosophical problems, then I’m inclined to say analytic philosophy ‘faults’ as a discipline – but in case not, then I wouldn’t say it necessarily faults.


  5. Pingback: Bourdieu and academical philosophy | Recollecting Philosophy

  6. A marxist post-structuralist continental Ecole Normale Superieure professor and feminist activist was teaching a class on Martin Heidegger, known hermeneuticist.

    “Before the class begins, you must get on your knees and worship Nietzsche and accept that his genealogical method was the most highly-evolved theory the continent has ever known, even greater than Hegel’s dialectics!”

    At this moment a brave, rational, positivist analytic philosopher who had read more than 15000 pages of Popper and Wittgenstein and understood the raison d’etre of empricism and fully supported all modern hard sciences stood up and held up the constitution.

    “How universal is this text, frenchie?”

    The arrogant professor smirked quite Jewishly and smugly replied “It’s not universal at all, fucking positivist, its “truth” is rooted in our shared understandings about culture, the subject and the nexus of power and knowledge.”

    “Wrong. It’s been 225 years since human reason created it. if it was not universal, and post-modern relativism, as you say, is real… then it should be regarded as a myth now.”

    The professor was visibly shaken, and dropped his chalk and copy of On Grammatology. He stormed out of the room crying those ironic post-modern crocodile tears. There is no doubt that at this point our professor, Michel Foucault, wished he had pulled hiimself up by his bootstraps and become more than an AIDS ridden sadomasochist interested in fisting. He wished so much that he had some kind of truth to hold on to, but he himself had written to disprove it!

    The students applauded and all rolled into American universities that day and accepted Wittgenstein as the end of philosophy. An eagle named “Formal logic” flew into the room and perched atop the copy of “Principa Mathematica” and shed a tear on the hardcover. The last sentence of “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” was read several times, and Karl Popper himself showed up and demonstrated how dialectics is nothing but a means of justifying contradictions.

    The professor lost his tenure and was fired the next day. He died of the gay plague AIDS and his “books” were disregarded for all eternity.


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