[Conceptually 'Plushed']: Grover’s intensive & differenciated drama

Perhaps a little belated, but speaking of affective monsters, plushie creatures and conceptual engendering, I just couldn’t leave the chance to expose what may be the schizo-case of our dearest uncle Grover :-) , who is specially referenced in my ‘Gilulz Delulz’ Letter to a Harsh Zizek [here], and who might be incarnating a good example of how the erraticness of the terms that I have referred in a previous post [here], can lead to a joyful affect that would also mean a conceptual and didactic implication. As it is suggested in such a post, this erraticness would be leaded by an active and ‘more correct’ epistemological orientation towards life that would bring experience to an open understanding of the world. As the affective monster that he is, we can consider that furry Grover performs and incarnates this implication in each one of his presentations, because after all, he is the plush monster who has taught us the most elemental concepts to understand the very own spatio-temporal coordinates of the world ;-) ―in our basic experience and learning of it― ie, the near and far [here], the heavy and light [here], the long and short [here], the over, under, around and through [here], even the small and big [here] ;-) , among other performativities that would even singularize him as a conceptual character [here and here], and that would deterritorialize him into the moon or into the desert with his own bed as territory [here]. Continue reading

[Conceptually 'Plushed']: An erratic but joyful idea…

Some posts ago I commented in reply to Terence Blake [here] about how any epistemology of experience, specially when it aims to reach a broader level of knowledge that is out of our comprehension ―but that would be referred empirically to life and its event―, can only be necessarily erratic in its terms, though its orientation to an open understanding of the world, would still be correct. I bring this here because I want to introduce in which sense sometimes this active and ‘more correct’ orientation towards life can lead its erratic terms into a joyful affect, far from any apparent reason, and pointing out to its affirmation. While this erraticness of the terms is something that I have understood since a time ago ―ie, by following Gregory Bateson’s ideas on deutero-learning―, it came to my mind again last year precisely when I was composing part of the content of the ‘deleuze-lulz’ response that I wrote as a collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal [here]. As I have referred in my previous post [here], such collaboration is actually a simulated Letter to a harsh Zizek from Deleuze himself, who convinced me to dispose myself to be taken from behind by him :-) ―or better to say by his own doubled ‘Gilulz Delulz’ ;-) ―, so to make me write down what he wanted to speak in his own defense. But this is indeed the erraticness of the terms that I want to bring here with respect to my collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal: for instance, the affectiveness of giving voice to Deleuze: to pump him a bit of life with the love I received of his work ―as an actual dead friend of mine―, so to let him find the chance to respond in favor of life and its affirmation, against Zizek’s negativity, all through my own intensive reading of his work. In fact, the whole affective issue of Deleuze’s philosophical buggery, ie, the whole issue of what motivated him to declare in terms of buggery [here] the way he coped with the constrictions that the history of philosophy imposed him as a philosopher, cannot be but part of this erraticness of terms that are oriented to life and its affirmation.

Slavoj Zizek affectively seen by his readers

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Deleuze, Žižek & Trolls

When I was invited to participate in the interdisciplinary journal ‘Deleuze and The Lulz: Radical Emergence for the lulz’ [link], I was told that the aim of the first issue of the journal was to present a radical point of view about Deleuze and his philosophy, in terms of ‘lulz’.

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Our epistemological ground: the fall into account

“Yesteryear, under the comical of his memorable adventures, Felix the Cat was represented in a similar situation to which we have described here. He runs at full speed. Suddenly, he realizes, and the spectators along with him, that there is no ground: just a moment ago he left the edge of the cliff where he was walking. It is until the moment he realizes, that he then falls into the void. Perhaps in this representation is possible to evoke the problem and the perception of which Foucault’s book is a testimony…”

Michel de Certeau
Histoire et psychanalyse entre science et fiction
Editions Gallimard. 1987. (Rev.ed. 2002)

Singing microfascisms

Music: Jennifer Delfino
Video: Nick Fox-Gieg

I found this music video on YouTube that seems very useful to illustrate what is a microfascism. We start from the idea that a microfascism emerges when there is a blocked and repressed desire that is molarized through a codificated flow which investment is totalitarian. When that happens, the creative line of flight that involves  desire becomes a line of abolition or a line of death. In the video we have a girl who wants to be famous and whose subjectivity lies encysted in common sense. Continue reading