Tag Archives: intensive reading
Intensive Immunity: Keeping fidelity or betraying Deleuze
Just a few days ago Steven Craig from Noir Realism blogged an interesting post [here] about keeping fidelity or betraying Deleuze, which I still want to comment as I think it refers to one important aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy: his intensive reading [*,*,*,*]. Following Eleanor Kaufman’s new book on Deleuze, Steven does not consider with her that Badiou, Zizek and Hallward would escape from being traitors-explicators of Deleuze: they would also be falling into their own trap in their attempts of betrayal. In the first quote that Steven shares in his post, Kaufman suggests that keeping fidelity to Deleuze is an imperative that means a trap in which many of his disciples tend to fall, and that the dialectic of fidelity and betrayal is ‘arguably removed from Deleuze’s thought’. But while the dialectic of fidelity and betrayal is just another variant of the Master and Slave dialectic –therefore, it has no room in Deleuze’s thought–, it is worth to remember that, with respect to the History of Philosophy, Deleuze was not indifferent about the constrictive effects of this dialectic, on the contrary: he used it on his favour so to keep fidelity to those authors he loved and to betray those that would only mortify life with their philosophies. We know that in this sense he was very proud to take the ‘role of traitor’ with respect to Hegel, though, we also know that this was not much against Hegel but against the History of Philosophy, as his betrayal was an act of consistency regarded to the philosophers he loved and that affirmed life with their philosophies. Continue reading
KEZIZ! Zizek Gets It Backwards [at AGENT SWARM]
In the same vein of the latest series of posts just recently blogged here at Schizosophy, Terence Blake has shared his own critical part at AGENT SWARM, by posting two incisive and suggestive entries on Zizek’s misreading of Deleuze’s intensive reading ―particularly of Deleuze’s ‘Letter To A Harsh Severe Critic’ and specifically of Deleuze’s famous ‘ass fuck’ ‘buggery’ quote―: KEZIZ!, Zizek Gets It Backwards I & II: Deleuze’s “buggery” quote retranslated, and The Immaculate Conception is not The Virgin Birth. Continue reading
[Conceptually 'Plushed']: An erratic but joyful idea…
Some posts ago I commented in reply to Terence Blake [here] about how any epistemology of experience, specially when it aims to reach a broader level of knowledge that is out of our comprehension ―but that would be referred empirically to life and its event―, can only be necessarily erratic in its terms, though its orientation to an open understanding of the world, would still be correct. I bring this here because I want to introduce in which sense sometimes this active and ‘more correct’ orientation towards life can lead its erratic terms into a joyful affect, far from any apparent reason, and pointing out to its affirmation. While this erraticness of the terms is something that I have understood since a time ago ―ie, by following Gregory Bateson’s ideas on deutero-learning―, it came to my mind again last year precisely when I was composing part of the content of the ‘deleuze-lulz’ response that I wrote as a collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal [here]. As I have referred in my previous post [here], such collaboration is actually a simulated Letter to a harsh Zizek from Deleuze himself, who convinced me to dispose myself to be taken from behind by him
―or better to say by his own doubled ‘Gilulz Delulz’
―, so to make me write down what he wanted to speak in his own defense. But this is indeed the erraticness of the terms that I want to bring here with respect to my collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal: for instance, the affectiveness of giving voice to Deleuze: to pump him a bit of life with the love I received of his work ―as an actual dead friend of mine―, so to let him find the chance to respond in favor of life and its affirmation, against Zizek’s negativity, all through my own intensive reading of his work. In fact, the whole affective issue of Deleuze’s philosophical buggery, ie, the whole issue of what motivated him to declare in terms of buggery [here] the way he coped with the constrictions that the history of philosophy imposed him as a philosopher, cannot be but part of this erraticness of terms that are oriented to life and its affirmation.

Slavoj Zizek affectively seen by his readers
Deleuze, Žižek & Trolls
When I was invited to participate in the interdisciplinary journal ‘Deleuze and The Lulz: Radical Emergence for the lulz’ [link], I was told that the aim of the first issue of the journal was to present a radical point of view about Deleuze and his philosophy, in terms of ‘lulz’.