The characteristics of the environmental system in which biological systems are inserted are mental characteristics: this means that they are immanent to the environmental system in its totality. Biological systems are part of the entire environmental system they experiment, part of the content of that system. Continue reading
Gregory Bateson’s anthropology of communication provides a perspective of the experience from a systemic and formal approach. This approach is underlined mainly by the theory of deutero-learning and the importance of this theory is based on what Bateson tended to call ‘double-bind’. Continue reading
Perhaps a little belated, but speaking of affective monsters, plushie creatures and conceptual engendering, I just couldn’t leave the chance to expose what may be the schizo-case of our dearest uncle Grover , who is specially referenced in my ‘Gilulz Delulz’ Letter to a Harsh Zizek [here], and who might be incarnating a good example of how the erraticness of the terms that I have referred in a previous post [here], can lead to a joyful affect that would also mean a conceptual and didactic implication. As it is suggested in such a post, this erraticness would be leaded by an active and ‘more correct’ epistemological orientation towards life that would bring experience to an open understanding of the world. As the affective monster that he is, we can consider that furry Grover performs and incarnates this implication in each one of his presentations, because after all, he is the plush monster who has taught us the most elemental concepts to understand the very own spatio-temporal coordinates of the world ―in our basic experience and learning of it― ie, the near and far [here], the heavy and light [here], the long and short [here], the over, under, around and through [here], even the small and big [here] , among other performativities that would even singularize him as a conceptual character [here and here], and that would deterritorialize him into the moon or into the desert with his own bed as territory [here]. Continue reading
In the same vein of the latest series of posts just recently blogged here at Schizosophy, Terence Blake has shared his own critical part at AGENT SWARM, by posting two incisive and suggestive entries on Zizek’s misreading of Deleuze’s intensive reading ―particularly of Deleuze’s ‘Letter To A
Harsh Severe Critic’ and specifically of Deleuze’s famous ‘ass fuck’ ‘buggery’ quote―: KEZIZ!, Zizek Gets It Backwards I & II: Deleuze’s “buggery” quote retranslated, and The Immaculate Conception is not The Virgin Birth. Continue reading
Some posts ago I commented in reply to Terence Blake [here] about how any epistemology of experience, specially when it aims to reach a broader level of knowledge that is out of our comprehension ―but that would be referred empirically to life and its event―, can only be necessarily erratic in its terms, though its orientation to an open understanding of the world, would still be correct. I bring this here because I want to introduce in which sense sometimes this active and ‘more correct’ orientation towards life can lead its erratic terms into a joyful affect, far from any apparent reason, and pointing out to its affirmation. While this erraticness of the terms is something that I have understood since a time ago ―ie, by following Gregory Bateson’s ideas on deutero-learning―, it came to my mind again last year precisely when I was composing part of the content of the ‘deleuze-lulz’ response that I wrote as a collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal [here]. As I have referred in my previous post [here], such collaboration is actually a simulated Letter to a harsh Zizek from Deleuze himself, who convinced me to dispose myself to be taken from behind by him ―or better to say by his own doubled ‘Gilulz Delulz’ ―, so to make me write down what he wanted to speak in his own defense. But this is indeed the erraticness of the terms that I want to bring here with respect to my collaboration for the ‘Deleuze and The Lulz’ journal: for instance, the affectiveness of giving voice to Deleuze: to pump him a bit of life with the love I received of his work ―as an actual dead friend of mine―, so to let him find the chance to respond in favor of life and its affirmation, against Zizek’s negativity, all through my own intensive reading of his work. In fact, the whole affective issue of Deleuze’s philosophical buggery, ie, the whole issue of what motivated him to declare in terms of buggery [here] the way he coped with the constrictions that the history of philosophy imposed him as a philosopher, cannot be but part of this erraticness of terms that are oriented to life and its affirmation.Continue reading
When I was invited to participate in the interdisciplinary journal ‘Deleuze and The Lulz: Radical Emergence for the lulz’ [link], I was told that the aim of the first issue of the journal was to present a radical point of view about Deleuze and his philosophy, in terms of ‘lulz’.
In his book Philosophische Temperamente Von Platon bis Foucault, Peter Sloterdijk emphasizes how in Foucault is recognized what it means for the ‘human being’ to draw historical and philosophical conclusions from the death of God. In this sense, he considers that the ‘Foucault-phenomenon’ is similar to ‘Nietzsche-phenomenon’ in which the ‘quasi-Platonic passions’ led to ‘anti-Platonic exercises’. Being Nietzschean himself, Sloterdijk stresses that, in Foucault, the figure of Nietzsche, Blanchot and Bataille is that of ‘the thinkers who vaccinate their readers with madness and who mediate between them and the monstrous’; though, for him: ‘the transformation of the idealistic sciences into structuralism was crucial for Foucault’ and ‘only in this unique situation that marks a decisive stage in the transformation of post-metaphysical philosophical thought could take place what later would be called the ‘Foucault-event’’. For Sloterdijk, Foucault was:
One’s life is not what it seems, nor is what we were taught since childhood. The idea of living life is reduced to a life tracked by common sense. It is the own gravity that signifies history, its own significant weight, that tends to lead us down to the paths that oppress our body. An avatar of language, dense and shriveled, divides us and fragments us in its suspicion, dualizes us and dialectizes us in its question: it makes us think that we think, it makes us think that we live, while it only shows us its ideological slant. Such avatar is with no doubt a matrix that subjects us, an inertia with which we identify ourselves: it leads us to think out with great evidence, that life is circumscribed only to grow, to get married, to have children, to work and to die. The doxa: our false consciousness. Such avatar of language, while it reveals as an inherent goal to us and to our around, is an avatar of how we mean life, and also of what we make of it while we signify it. But it’s found far behind, it does not reach us: it becomes a prison that we carry from inside and that hampers us: it turns into a limit that lives in our flesh and individualizes us intimately in our tomb. We touch ourselves and do not feel us. We close our eyes and see nothing.