‘Zero Intensity’ & The New Celibate Machine [quoted in Anti-Oedipus]

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“There is an actual consumption of the new machine, a pleasure that can rightly be called autoerotic, or rather automatic: the nuptial celebration of a new alliance, a new birth, a radiant ecstasy, as though the eroticism of the machine liberated other unlimited forces. The question becomes: what does the celibate machine produce? what is produced by means of it? The answer would seem to be: intensive quantities. There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable –a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form. These are often described as hallucinations and delirium, but the basic phenomenon of hallucination (I see, I hear) and the basic phenomenon of delirium (I think…) presuppose an I feel at an even deeper level, which gives hallucinations their object and thought delirium its content –an “I feel that I am becoming a woman,” “that I am becoming a god,” and so on, which is neither delirious nor hallucinatory, but will project the hallucination or internalize the delirium. Delirium and hallucination are secondary in relation to the really primary emotion, which in the beginning only experiences intensities, becomings, transitions. Continue reading

‘Close though-still-misguided’: three schizosophical impressions about Joshua Ramey’s introduction to The Hermetic Deleuze

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The Revolution of Thought: an Ethical ‘Take of Consistency’

The revolution of thought can only happen from the small revolutions or changes that occur both at the level of the symbolic structures that feed the representation of the world, and at the level of the ethical experience of those who signify and are signified by such structures. It is then the philosopher who is forced to break with the epistemological subject that history has granted him by default and that is meant by these structures, in order to construct an ethical subject that would be no less epistemological regards to life and the experience of living it. While experimentation is a line that escapes from all what these structures signify, and while it involves a sort of change or transformation, this change or transformation cannot happen without the affirmativity of an event that allows the philosopher to effectuate a rupture within his existence so to reveal himself before the gravity of history. Philosophy is an event susceptible to happen in the life of the philosopher despite of his existence: it is something that materially happens in life, something unobjectable that impacts and threatens it in order to break with all its transcendencies and to connect the experience of living it, the experience of life, with its immanence: the immanence of life. Continue reading

‘Can We Think Democratically?’ Discussing Non-Philosophy with John Mullarkey

This discussion might be of interest for those who are interested in Schizosophy. It really started a few months ago when John posted in his Facebook page, a picture of what then was the new incoming Laruelle’s Anti-Badiou book. As the expectations around the book were emerging, many of the commenters there were already celebrating what then was prefiguring as a radical critique of Badiou’s philosophy. In my case, as I have always been critical of how Badiou has cancerously interpreted and prefixed Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of anti-philosophy, it just stroke me how Laruelle’s intention to boomerang Badiou’s taste on prefixes seemed to be just another intriguing but not so impressive enterprise of false radicality. With that respect, I just wielded a critical comment charged with the usual frankness and straightness that I always like to garnish with no big offense:

“Laruelle’s pale fad of prefixing whatever he likes (which is also a very Badiouan practice) seems to confirm itself just as a false radicality: in this occasion, ascribing himself to a repressed Badiouism.. What should we expect from a Heideggerian that thinks he can overcome Heidegger faking Nietzsche’s epistemic break? Seems to me that, with this new book, Laruelle is prompt to be just another bureaucrat of the Badiouan text. Both too depotentialized to my taste!”

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The Foucaultian Affirmation (1964)

DEMONBYNES
Regards to Nietzsche, you have said that the experience of madness was the most approximate to absolute knowledge …May I ask you to what extent, in your opinion, Nietzsche had the experience of madness? If you could have time, of course, would be quite interesting to ask the same question in relation to other great minds, whether if they were both poets and writers such as Hölderlin, Nerval or Maupassant, or musicians such as Schumann, Henri Duparc and Ravel. But continuing in terms of Nietzsche, have I understood you properly? …Because you have unquestionably spoken of this experience of madness. Is this what you meant? Continue reading

Sloterdijk on Foucault: the nature of the event

In his book Philosophische Temperamente Von Platon bis Foucault, Peter Sloterdijk emphasizes how in Foucault is recognized what it means for the ‘human being’ to draw historical and philosophical conclusions from the death of God. In this sense, he considers that the ‘Foucault-phenomenon’ is similar to ‘Nietzsche-phenomenon’ in which the ‘quasi-Platonic passions’ led to ‘anti-Platonic exercises’. Being Nietzschean himself, Sloterdijk stresses that, in Foucault, the figure of Nietzsche, Blanchot and Bataille is that of ‘the thinkers who vaccinate their readers with madness and who mediate between them and the monstrous’; though, for him: ‘the transformation of the idealistic sciences into structuralism was crucial for Foucault’ and ‘only in this unique situation that marks a decisive stage in the transformation of post-metaphysical philosophical thought could take place what later would be called the ‘Foucault-event’’. For Sloterdijk, Foucault was:

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