Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari
Terence Blake at his AGENT SWARM has posted a discussion we had last Saturday in Facebook –with the special apparition of John Mullarkey–, that was launched by a critique I made regarding non-philosophy as a fad of false radicality –i.e, the same old critique I wielded last year in another discussion I had with John [here]–. I do not want to write and repeat again all what I have said about the question, because I do have made myself clear with respect to my position and objections, and I am happy to see that this is also reflected in Terence’s response to John, which not only considered my arguments but also introduced the important theme of experiencing/experimenting with intensities as a philosophical condition to think life and its immanence. In his response, Terence asked John two very interesting and extremely well posed questions as to invite him to go further with the discussion in a more Deleuzian even schizoanalytical fashion:
“(1) when an academic philosopher thinks he is making the leap into immanence (remembering Deleuze’s expression of “making the movement” or staying in reflection) is he deluding himself or is this, as both Deleuze and Guattari suggest, a real possibility. Is being critical and temporalising and democratic enough to make the leap? (2) when a non-academic thinker thinks he has made the leap, is he being over-confident in his intensities, or is he expressing and incarnating an important part of the immanental process?” Continue reading
The revolution of thought can only happen from the small revolutions or changes that occur both at the level of the symbolic structures that feed the representation of the world, and at the level of the ethical experience of those who signify and are signified by such structures. It is then the philosopher who is forced to break with the epistemological subject that history has granted him by default and that is meant by these structures, in order to construct an ethical subject that would be no less epistemological regards to life and the experience of living it. While experimentation is a line that escapes from all what these structures signify, and while it involves a sort of change or transformation, this change or transformation cannot happen without the affirmativity of an event that allows the philosopher to effectuate a rupture within his existence so to reveal himself before the gravity of history. Philosophy is an event susceptible to happen in the life of the philosopher despite of his existence: it is something that materially happens in life, something unobjectable that impacts and threatens it in order to break with all its transcendencies and to connect the experience of living it, the experience of life, with its immanence: the immanence of life. Continue reading
This discussion might be of interest for those who are interested in Schizosophy. It really started a few months ago when John posted in his Facebook page, a picture of what then was the new incoming Laruelle’s Anti-Badiou book. As the expectations around the book were emerging, many of the commenters there were already celebrating what then was prefiguring as a radical critique of Badiou’s philosophy. In my case, as I have always been critical of how Badiou has cancerously interpreted and prefixed Nietzsche’s philosophy in terms of anti-philosophy, it just stroke me how Laruelle’s intention to boomerang Badiou’s taste on prefixes seemed to be just another intriguing but not so impressive enterprise of false radicality. With that respect, I just wielded a critical comment charged with the usual frankness and straightness that I always like to garnish with no big offense:
“Laruelle’s pale fad of prefixing whatever he likes (which is also a very Badiouan practice) seems to confirm itself just as a false radicality: in this occasion, ascribing himself to a repressed Badiouism.. What should we expect from a Heideggerian that thinks he can overcome Heidegger faking Nietzsche’s epistemic break? Seems to me that, with this new book, Laruelle is prompt to be just another bureaucrat of the Badiouan text. Both too depotentialized to my taste!”
Madness is something that has to do with a great deception. But it is not the end: it can also be seen as an active liberation of thought. Madness happens as if thought would unravel and fly like a kite. In the end, madness only comes when one has lost its thread, when there is not more to unravel and when the kite goes vertically to the stratosphere. Whoever goes mad is the one who unhands more thread without giving sense to the singular reel that holds it: the one who releases it away to be lost. But is not the same to become mad than to be-a-crazy. One can be a happy madman and live with that, because sometimes the thread never ends to unstitch. Perhaps it is needed to live many lives to be a madman worthy of madness. As mad as one might be, nowadays it is enough to simply follow the “script” of normality that surround us ―while keeping on laughing intimately at it― so to remain unnoticed. Many have made history by doing that and that is why their names still shine. And yes, as Nietzsche puts it with Zarathustra: we dance between these two worlds. In fact, dancing is what best describes this coming and going of madness.
If we google the word ‘schizosophy‘ we can get a link to chapter 3 of Harlan Wilson’s “Technologized Desire: Selfhood & the Body in Postcapitalist Science Fiction”, a book where the word appears twice: just widely announced in the title of the chapter “Schizosophy of the Medieval Dead”, and also ‘quote-marked’ in the following paragraph:
“Unlike their arch-enemy General Freud, Deleuze and Guattari do not merely speculate about whether or not civilization is pathological. They assume it is, building their “schizosophy” on the foundation of madness. For them, it is not a question of one being mad; it is a question of intensities, of the degree to which one is mad. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing. ‘Madness need not be all breakdown. It may also be breakthrough’ (Anti-Oedipus 131). Not a breakthrough to a transcendental self, but possibly to a new subject-position or a different state of desiring-production.”
Despite that this literary definition sounds too elemental, it’s nice to see how it does provide a prelusive wink of that what gives schizosophy its specificity.