‘Zero Intensity’ & The New Celibate Machine [quoted in Anti-Oedipus]

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“There is an actual consumption of the new machine, a pleasure that can rightly be called autoerotic, or rather automatic: the nuptial celebration of a new alliance, a new birth, a radiant ecstasy, as though the eroticism of the machine liberated other unlimited forces. The question becomes: what does the celibate machine produce? what is produced by means of it? The answer would seem to be: intensive quantities. There is a schizophrenic experience of intensive quantities in their pure state, to a point that is almost unbearable –a celibate misery and glory experienced to the fullest, like a cry suspended between life and death, an intense feeling of transition, states of pure, naked intensity stripped of all shape and form. These are often described as hallucinations and delirium, but the basic phenomenon of hallucination (I see, I hear) and the basic phenomenon of delirium (I think…) presuppose an I feel at an even deeper level, which gives hallucinations their object and thought delirium its content –an “I feel that I am becoming a woman,” “that I am becoming a god,” and so on, which is neither delirious nor hallucinatory, but will project the hallucination or internalize the delirium. Delirium and hallucination are secondary in relation to the really primary emotion, which in the beginning only experiences intensities, becomings, transitions. Continue reading

‘Close though-still-misguided’: three schizosophical impressions about Joshua Ramey’s introduction to The Hermetic Deleuze

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The Event of the Nietzschean Experience

Bust of Nietzsche by the German sculptor Max Klinger (1902)

Bust of Nietzsche by Max Klinger (1902)

After a century much has been said and written about the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche: his life and his work have formed part of the events of History, and it is History who has magnified his name in the horizon of our time. With golden letters, History has nailed the name of Nietzsche in the surface of its registered domains and has been able to let us know his philosophy: as the Dionysian philologist who undermined the body of Greek tragedy; as the febrile critic of moral prejudices; as a free spirit unleashed from religious subservience and from the weight of the ordinary; either as the Western spokesman of becoming, of transvaluation, of the Overman and the Eternal Return. And much is already known about the process outlined in Nietzsche`s thought: about the need to continually affirm the freedom of the will; about the constant rush to criticize the metaphysical idealism and the constant regurgitations of its categorical stools in Being, in Essence, and in the Moral Subject. So much is also known about the urgency to weigh the exaltation that expresses the infallible negation of life for the ideals that shape a Socratic happiness, a Platonic sensibility, a Christian devotion, or even a Socialist presumption. History has been able to gobble the event of the Nietzschean experience but not without getting indigested of the satiation that the Nietzschean thought extracts from existence. Against the negation of life for those ideals that constitute the sorrows of History, Nietzsche proposed a negativity that polarizes it transposing the values that it settles: values that continue to coalesce gravely in the common experience of the human being. Nietzsche conditioned the imminence of History, denying all the ballast of its values and raising a vital-ism that claims and reclaims always for his perpetual come back, for its Eternal Return: that vital value ends up to be the pole that forces History to extreme itself and to collapse in the body of an existence that releases itself from its inert oppression. Continue reading

Nietzsche: ‘All the Names in History’ [quoted in Anti-Oedipus]

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“There is no Nietzsche­ the-self, professor of philology, who suddenly loses his mind and supposedly identifies with all sorts of strange people; rather, there is the Nietzschean subject who passes through a series of states, and who identifies these states with the names of history: “every name in history is I…” It is not a matter of identifying with various historical personages, but rather identifying the names of history with zones of intensity on the body without organs; and each time Nietzsche-as-subject exclaims: “They’re me! So it’s me!” No one has ever been as deeply involved in history as the schizo, or dealt with it in this way. He consumes all of universal history in one fell swoop. We began by defining him as Homo natura, and low and behold, he has become Homo historia.”

Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari

History as a Snack of Self-Reference: The Young Nietzsche

Even before being a philologist, Nietzsche would admonish that the will cannot happen itself but as a breach with the established meanings that circulate History. Fortunately, Nietzsche would never stop to offer a reversed testimony in the history of his philosophical experience: since his early youth he would expose his humanity before the irruption of a significant center of which movement discovered the spiral of every search for meaning, and of which preponderance exuded a corporal vitality that is hardly affordable.

“Everything moves in giant circles, revolving around each other while they become, the man is one of the inner circles.”

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Nietzsche’s Stimmung as a Raw Material Emotion [quoted in Anti-Oedipus]

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“The centrifugal forces do not flee the center forever, but approach it once again, only to retreat from it yet again: such is the nature of the violent oscillations that overwhelm an individual so long as he seeks only his own center and is incapable of seeing the circle of which he himself is a part; for if these oscillations overwhelm him, it is because each one of them corresponds to an individual other than the one he believes himself to be, from the point of view of the unlocatable center. As a result, an identity is essentially fortuitous, and a series of individualities must be undergone by each of these oscillations, so that as a consequence the fortuitousness of this or that particular individuality will render all of them necessary.”

Pierre Klossowski, extracted from his Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle

The Leap into Immanence: a post-Deleuzian Epistemological Distinction between Philosophy and Schizosophy

Terence Blake at his AGENT SWARM has posted a discussion we had last Saturday in Facebook –with the special apparition of John Mullarkey–, that was launched by a critique I made regarding non-philosophy as a fad of false radicality –i.e, the same old critique I wielded last year in another discussion I had with John [here]–. I do not want to write and repeat again all what I have said about the question, because I do have made myself clear with respect to my position and objections, and I am happy to see that this is also reflected in Terence’s response to John, which not only considered my arguments but also introduced the important theme of experiencing/experimenting with intensities as a philosophical condition to think life and its immanence. In his response, Terence asked John two very interesting and extremely well posed questions as to invite him to go further with the discussion in a more Deleuzian even schizoanalytical fashion:

“(1) when an academic philosopher thinks he is making the leap into immanence (remembering Deleuze’s expression of “making the movement” or staying in reflection) is he deluding himself or is this, as both Deleuze and Guattari suggest, a real possibility. Is being critical and temporalising and democratic enough to make the leap? (2) when a non-academic thinker thinks he has made the leap, is he being over-confident in his intensities, or is he expressing and incarnating an important part of the immanental process?” Continue reading

The Revolution of Thought: an Ethical ‘Take of Consistency’

The revolution of thought can only happen from the small revolutions or changes that occur both at the level of the symbolic structures that feed the representation of the world, and at the level of the ethical experience of those who signify and are signified by such structures. It is then the philosopher who is forced to break with the epistemological subject that history has granted him by default and that is meant by these structures, in order to construct an ethical subject that would be no less epistemological regards to life and the experience of living it. While experimentation is a line that escapes from all what these structures signify, and while it involves a sort of change or transformation, this change or transformation cannot happen without the affirmativity of an event that allows the philosopher to effectuate a rupture within his existence so to reveal himself before the gravity of history. Philosophy is an event susceptible to happen in the life of the philosopher despite of his existence: it is something that materially happens in life, something unobjectable that impacts and threatens it in order to break with all its transcendencies and to connect the experience of living it, the experience of life, with its immanence: the immanence of life. Continue reading