In his book ‘The presence of myth’, Leszek Kolakowski reflects what he sees as the culture of analgesics: he points out to the myth of the presence of oneself as an experience that puts the individual in relation with his innerside and with his body from what he considers is the escape beneath the phenomenon of world`s indifference. This escape takes its relevance regards to what is concerned to the construction of sense, mostly because it happens in the conscience of the individual as he is not only a subject in the world, but also as the experience of heterogeneity itself represents for him a condition of escape, ie, against the affirmation that the own inherence of the human being is founded on the avoidance of suffering. According to Kolakowski, everytime that suffering is determined beneath the escape of the phenomenon of indifference, it might be posed the claim that escaping from suffering is a tautology. Therefore, one cannot escape from what has already escaped, or from the own sentiment of escaping. Kolakowski asures that certain sufferings cannot be avoided: the bodily pain is a paradoxical experience in which the body becomes indifferent beneath the individual, and where the negativities of life become noticeable perceptible manifestations of indifference.
One’s life is not what it seems, nor is what we were taught since childhood. The idea of living life is reduced to a life tracked by common sense. It is the own gravity that signifies history, its own significant weight, that tends to lead us down to the paths that oppress our body. An avatar of language, dense and shriveled, divides us and fragments us in its suspicion, dualizes us and dialectizes us in its question: it makes us think that we think, it makes us think that we live, while it only shows us its ideological slant. Such avatar is with no doubt a matrix that subjects us, an inertia with which we identify ourselves: it leads us to think out with great evidence, that life is circumscribed only to grow, to get married, to have children, to work and to die. The doxa: our false consciousness. Such avatar of language, while it reveals as an inherent goal to us and to our around, is an avatar of how we mean life, and also of what we make of it while we signify it. But it’s found far behind, it does not reach us: it becomes a prison that we carry from inside and that hampers us: it turns into a limit that lives in our flesh and individualizes us intimately in our tomb. We touch ourselves and do not feel us. We close our eyes and see nothing.
If Nietzsche confronts individuality with collectivity, the presence with the tragedy molten in the past, he does so through a rupture that occurs in the immediacy of his own existence, in an event that reveals the mantle that sustains the activity of language. Such mantle he raises thus to glimpse the apollonian and dionysian powers, to question the dream and intoxication, the graphisms crystallized of history and the converged sonority of thought. The line that crosses such an event bifurcates the times of history and composes them from its subjective prism. At first, the homeric question is guarded by Nietzsche as an angular stone towards the classic: fragmenting and refracting the folk poetry in a projection that becomes active in the present and that confabulates the reason of a theatrical retrojection that reacts to the voices attracted by the past. While the homeric question silences the tragedy beyond the impassable axis of the classic, although it constitutes a scream that ignites the historical presence of language, it also conspires like a diamond-light that petrifies him immediately: on the one hand, making Homer a wealth of significations and collective narratives which meaning and value sediment the aesthetic formations held in history; on the other hand, setting up his unexpected individuality in an outlook that goes through the present language to the tragedy itself. Continue reading →
To discern the nietzschean perspective from the preponderance of language, it is necessary to place the aestheticism that Nietzsche imposed in the epoch of his philological studies. Since then, Nietzsche tried to decipher the classic texts of ancient Greece from the primordial unity of knowledge and the manifested plurality of its phenomena. He considered that metaphysics, religion and art were the ways to access the philosophical truth of the world, and did not hesitated to contemplate them as openly superior to any science. That was the time when Nietzsche toured through his idealism in own flesh: giving himself up to all its glare and blinding to its melodic charm. But what moved him to roam those avatars was the antecedent of the experience of his rupture: of that great wound that restored the freedom of his spirit and predisposed the deployment of his thinking. Thus, Nietzsche’s philological studies were made permeable to its aestheticism from the opening he would experiment of his eventual liberty. That opening had already manifested itself as the active concretion of his historical present and as the split of his head open to the significance circumscribed to his perception of the world. That is why these studies were up to reopen the present foundments to history itself, with the intention of riding the previous principles that deepen what is historical in language. Today we would say that such reopening is nothing more than an unfolding, a refund of language to what is historically established, a display through which its lines converge on its discourse through time: whether to the extent that they constrain prior to its principles, either while they pour in their course the sense of its enunciated befall. Continue reading →
One of the interviews to Guattari that fills me the most because of its naturalness and its content and scope, is the one Charles Stivale made to him in March 1985. There, it can be read the opinion that Guattari had about the tendency, recurrent and academically vicious, of being occluded by the name of Deleuze to reference the work they did together. Stivale opens his interview addressing this occlusive blockage as correspondent to an effect that transforms the first name into a common noun and that erases the individual, ie, alluding to the approach Guattari himself had originally emphasized in a chapter of his book ‘La révolution moléculaire’. Before the question referred to how does he react to the effect of this blockage and to the effect that makes the name of Deleuze to appear, Guattari responds as follows: Continue reading →
According to the definition set above, the word micrology comes from micros (small) and logos (treat or speech). It refers to the science that uses a microscope to study the smallest or minimal things existing in nature. To say of this definition, the word also applies to denominate a short and concise mode of speech, besides that disparagingly it serves to describe a frivolous discourse. If a micrology concerns to the study of small things of nature with the aid of a microscope, what would be the instrument to study the little things of life in society? What tool would be used by a social micrology? What shall be its microscope? To say of a possible answer, if one considers that the social is something that is significantly constructed, language would come to be such an instrument through which a social micrology would endorse to study the minimal but not the less significant things of society. However, while it gives sense to the social -being that it is what composes its minimal parts-, language would construct such an instrument without being canceled or dissolved as an object of study. Continue reading →
The thought of Gilles Deleuze involves a powerful conceptualization developed from his works on the history of philosophy and above all from his own philosophical creations. Such conceptualization contains and composes all his perspective of life. Though since early he would let it see in Difference and Repetition, he would be given to potentialize it throughout all his work. As is known, such conceptualization is what he called ‘the image of thought’. In his latest book What is Philosophy?, and despite of having shared coauthorship with Felix Guattari, Deleuze continues the purely philosophical approach of the image of thought and extends it in relation to a plane of immanence. There’s where Deleuze reiterates the idea that the history of philosophy is comparable to the art of portraiture, and adds that such history has to try to clear the plane of immanence that the portrayed philosopher has established with his thought and with the concepts that he was able to create from his own singular perspective. He also admits that these mental portraits, noetic and machinic, can be made not only using philosophical means but also by other aesthetic mediations. In this sense he makes a critique of the artistic work of swiss sculptor Jean Tinguely, who is known for creating kinetic artifacts of da-da tradition also recognized as metamechanics. In 1988 Tinguely made a work of art in which he created machinic portraits of the thought of a number of philosophers. For example, this is the kinetic picture he proposed for Henri Bergson:
Discovering in own flesh that life is intranscendent is the best thing that ever happened to me. To think the immanence, to think life. To see the sun falling after the horizon that’s in me and erases me. To go towards him as its plain gives me land, sea and sky in my flight. Never to reach him and to be eternal with him. To start walking without moving. To dance and flash in situ. To be that peaceful lake inside.